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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA LARSEN and the ) 
STATE OF UTAH by and ) 
through Utah State ) 
Department of Social ) 
Services ) 
) 
Plaintiffs- ) 
Resnondents. ) 
) 
VS ) 
) 
DOUGLAS COLLINA ) 
) 
Defendant- ) 
Appellant ) 
Case No. 18328 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a paternity action on appeal from the Third 
Judicial District Court where Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default and for Relief From Judgment brought pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was denied. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's Motion was denied by the Honorable Maurice 
D. Jones following a hearing in the Third Judicial District 
Court on February 17, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Resnondents seek an affirmance of the lower Court's 
Order denying Appellant's Motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents desire to supplement and clarify the 
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Statement of Facts contained in Appellant's Brief as 
follows: 
On February 9, 1980, a copy of the Sunnnons and Complaint 
was served personally upon the Appellant (T. 6). On March 31, 
1980, Appellant answered the Complaint by and through his 
attorney, Bradley Parker (T. 7). 
Pursuant to Stipulation of the Parties and Order of 
the Court, blood tests were taken in May of 1980 (T. 9-10). 
In his report, a copy of which was attached to Appellant's 
Memorandum to the lower Court, Dr. C. W. DeWitt stated that 
on the basis of the blood tests, Mr. Collina cannot be 
excluded as the father on the basis of either ABO or HL-A 
typing, and further stated that the statistical probability 
that he is the father of the co-Plaintiff Larsen's child 
would be 100 oer cent with one consort and 74 per cent with 
two consorts (T. 64-65). 
As indicated by Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories, 
there is no evidence that co-Plaintiff had sexual relations 
with any person other than the Appellant during the period from 
December of 1975 to April of 1976, the period of conception 
(T. 52). 
On June 23, 1980, Interrogatories to Defendant were 
sent to Appellant's attorney, Bradley Parker and on August 13, 
1980, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, Gerald Conder, sent a 
letter to Mr. Parker stating that Plaintiff's attorney had not 
received the Answers and requested that the Answers be for-
-2-
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warded as soon as possible, or that we be advised if there 
were some problem (T. 78). 
On August 25, 1980, Gerald Conder filed a }fution to 
Strike Defendant's Answer based upon Defendant's failure to 
answer the Interrogatories, and the Motion was set for hearing 
on September 17, 1980. At that hearing, Gerald Conder 
represented to the Court that the Appellant's attorney 
(Bradely Parker) indicated that he had been unable to obtain 
coo?eration from his client, and Judge Sawaya ordered that 
Defendant be granted 15 days from September 17, 1980 in which 
to answer the Interrogatories. If the Interrogatories were 
not answered, it was the order of the Court that the Answers 
be stricken and default entered (T. 18-21). 
On October 20, 1980, the County Attorney's Office 
received Mr. Parker's ~·.:ithdra.wal of Counsel dated October 15, 
1980. Thereafter, on October 21, 1980, Notice to Obtai~ Nffi: 
Coansel was sent to t:1e Appellant instructing hir. to obt~.in 
new counsel immediately to renresent hin i~ the matter, or 
in the alternative, to appear in his own behalf (T. 23-24). 
Because Apµellant failed to comply with the Notice to 
Obtain New Counsel, his answer was stricken and Default 
Judgment was entered against him on December 17, 1980, more 
than two months subsequent to the Order of the Court entered 
on October 10, 1980. Furthermore, Appellant had taken no 
action to preserve his position in the 57 day elapse of 
time between the Notice to Obtain New Counsel and entry of 
-3-
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the Default Judgment (T. 25-28). 
Subsequent to the entry of Judgment Appellant filed 
a Complaint against Mr. Parker with the Utah State Bar. 
Mr. Parker filed a response dated Aoril 29, 1981, and the 
Complaint was dismissed (T, 93). 
At the hearing from which this appeal is taken, Mr. 
Parker's testimony was presented at the request of the Court 
by proffer of counsel, including the contents of Mr. Parker's 
response letter to the Utah State Bar (T. 93) 79-81). Counsel 
for Appellant made no objection to the proffer. Mr. Parker 
was present at the hearing pursuant to a Subpoena Duces 
Tecum and would have taken the stand to present the facts 
articulated in his response letter had not the Court asked 
for a proffer (T. 92). 
The response letter of Mr. Parker sets forth the facts 
as discussed thus far and further states: 
"Not only did Mr. Collina fail, after 
repeated requests, to contact our office, 
but he failed to pay his bill as well. Mr. 
Collina, when he finally did make contact 
with our office in February of this year, 
informed me that he had received a copy of 
the filed Withdrawal of Counsel (filed 
October 15, 1980), yet chose to take no 
action upon receiving this notice. The 
judgment in this matter was not entered 
until two months later on December 17, 1980. ~· 
Mr. Collina, by his own admission in 
his com~laint, received our billings and 
by his own admission to me received the 
Withdrawal of Counsel. It is difficult to 
believe that he did not receive our other 
corresponsence regarding the tissue tests 
and Interrogatories,'' (T. 79-80). 
-4-
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The letter of Bradley Parker, which was proffered 
into evidence without objection by Defendant, further 
states that the Appellant "was represented in this matter 
to the fullest extent his cooperation would allow." (T. 80). 
Consequently, the Court denied Appellant's Motion for 
Relief from Judgment (T. 82). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTION OF THE LOWER COURT INIENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIR11ED. 
This Court stated in Airkem Intermountain, Inc., 
v. Parker, (Ut.) 513 P.2d 429 (1973) that "(t)he trial 
court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in 
granting or denying a motion to relieve a party from final 
judgment under Rule 60 (b)(l), U.R.C.P. and this court will 
reverse the trial court only where an abuse of this discretion 
is clearly established." (At p. 431; see also Board of 
Education of Granite School District v. Cox, (Ut.) 384 P.2d 
806 (1963);Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., (Ut.) 376 P.2d 
951 (1962).) The Court in Airkern further recognized an interest 
in the successful parties to protect their judgment and its 
effect with the least hardship once a default judgment has 
been entered. It has been consistently stated that more than 
a claim that Appellant "did not have his day in court" is 
-5-
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required for a default judgment to be overturned (Airkem, supra; 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., (Ut.) 260 P.2d 741 (1953).) 
It has also been held that the courts should not be 
indulgent toward a defaulted party if such indulgence would 
work an injustice, inequity or hardship on the opposing 
party. (Warren, supra; Chrysler v. Chrysler, (Ut.) 589 P.2d 
995 (1956).) In Pitts v. Pine Meadows Ranch Inc., (Ut.) 589 
P.2d 767 (1978) this Court refused to reverse a default judgment 
because the successful litigants had moved from the country. 
To require their presence for a new trial would work an undue 
hardship because they most likely would not be able to 
attend the proceedings. 
The same rationale applies to the facts in this case 
since co-Plaintiff Linda Larsen closed her public assistance 
case on September 30, 1981, and counsel for the State of Utah 
has been unable to contact her and is unaware of her present 
whereabouts. Therefore, it would work an undue hardship and 
injustice to require the State to go forward with the 
presentation of its case absent the testimony and presence 
of the co-Plaintiff. 
In both Airkem and Warren, this Court held that a party 
seeking to vacate a default judgment must show that he used 
due diligence in the prosecution of his case and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no 
control. 
In the case of Heath v. Mower, (Ut.) 597 P~2d 855 (1979), 
-6-
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this Court refused to vacate a default judgment under facts 
virtually identical to those in the present case. In Heath, 
a Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment brought pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) was denied where Defendant failed to 
respond to repeated attempts to contact him regarding the 
status of a lawsuit he knew was pending and where he knew 
that a hearing had been scheduledand that his counsel had 
withdrawn. The Court stated that these actions of the 
Defendant vitiated any claims of due diligence and were 
therefore fatal to his Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment. 
In the present case, the facts show that Appellant was 
represented by counsel and participated in the answering of the 
Complaint; he then failed to cooperate with counsel and 
further failed to respond to attempts by counsel to contact 
him regarding the status of the pending lawsuit. Finally, 
Appellant knew that his counsel had withdrawn but failed to 
timely appoint new counsel. Under these facts and the holding 
of Heath, the Appellant has not in the least complied with 
the due diligence requirement and the default judgment should 
be affirmed. 
In the Brief of the Appellant, an argument is made 
concerning the probability of Appellant being the father 
of the co-Plaintiff's child. In Chrysler, (supra), it was held 
that a default appeal is to be decided purely on the circum-
stanced surrounding occassion of default. The merits of the 
case are not to be at issue and are not a basis for a?peal. 
- 7-
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Since the arguments of Appellant go to establishment of 
paternity (a merit of the case), such contentions should be 
ignored by the Court and have no bearing on the final dispo-
sition of this case. 
Appellant also contends (without cited authority) 
that his Affidavit was unopposed and should therefore be 
taken as true. This is patently false. The Affidavit was 
opposed and successfully contradicted at the hearing by the 
proffered testimony of Bradley Parker. In Chrysler (supra) 
this Court held that the trial court doesnot have to accept 
as true the facts alleged in affidavits of a party or his 
attorney despite the fact that there was no cross-examination 
on the facts alleged in those affidavits. It should also be 
noted that Appellant failed to appear at the hearing. 
Appellant cites both Mayhew (supra) and Ney v. 
Harrison, (Ut.) 299 P.2d 1114 (1956) as supportive of the 
position that his default should be overturned. These cases 
can be easily distinguished from the one at the bar on their 
facts. In Ney and Mayhew, the parties against whom default had 
been entered relied to their detriment upon a person who was 
neither their attorney nor their agent. In Ney, a wife relied 
on her husband to answer the Complaint; and in Mayhew 
process was served on a person who had previously been, but was 
no longer president of a company whose stockholders subsequently 
had a default entered against them without any notice of the 
µending lawsuit. In these cases, the appellants were granted 
0 --
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relief when they, through no fault of their own, mistakenly 
relied on a private individual to represent their interest. 
The present case and facts are much different. The 
person that Appellant herein alleged relied upon was his 
attorney. However, this reliance was not justifiable since 
the Appellant made no effort to contact his attorney when 
he knew the case was pending and that the Interrogatories 
needed to be answered. Furthermore, reliance on his attorney 
will not suffice to relieve Appellant of the default judgment 
under the holding of Warren (supra). This Court held therein 
that "although a judgment may be erroneous and inequitable 
equitable relief will not be granted to a party thereto on 
the sole ground that the negligence of the attorney, agent, 
trustee, or other representative of the present complafnant 
prevented a fair trial ... (Id. at 743). Therefore, reliance of 
Appellant on his attorney will not relieve him of the default 
judgment even if the acts of his attorney were negligent. 
In this case, the facts bear out that Appellant failed 
to contact his attorney despite the fact that he knew a 
lawsuit was pending; he failed to appoint a new attorney 
when notified to do so; and he failed to answer Interrogatories 
after being given the chance to do so not once, but twice. 
Therefore, this Court should follow the rule of Airkem and hold 
that Appellant'·s conduct was not entirely excusable and that 
the lower Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
relieve Appellant of the judgment under those circl.llllstances 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT COMM:ITTED NO ERROR BY ALLEGEDLY 
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE A :MEMORANDUM WHICH ARGUED 
THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD TESTS AND CONTAINED A 
LETTER WRITTEN BY APPELLANT'S FORMER ATTORNEY. 
ERROR WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL BY APPELLANT. 
SINCE THE DOCUMENT WAS Sil1PLY A MEMORANDUM, 
THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT THAT PRIOR SERVICE BE 
MADE TO APPELLANT. 
Appellant fails to mention in his Brief to this Court 
that he quoted verbatim the contents of the letter from 
Dr. C. W. DeWitt in his Memorandlllil to the lower Court and 
attached a copy of the letter to his Memorandum. Further-
more, Appellant quotes affirmatively the contents of the DeWitt 
letter in his Brief to this Court. (at page 6). It is in-
conceivable that the use of this letter should be prejudicial 
to the Appellant when he has and is using the contents of 
that letter in the presentation of his case. 
Asstnning arguendo that the documents were incorrectly 
received by the lower Court, Appellant has lost the opportunity 
to make this argument since he failed to preserve the alleged 
error for appeal. The evidence complained of was offered as a 
proffer (as Appellant's Brief admits), and Appellant made 
absolutely no objection to or cross-examination of said evidence 
(T. 92-94). Since there was no objectionr Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides that the judgment cannot be 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
overturned for an alleged erroneous admission of evidence 
under these circumstances. (See also 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and 
Error §601.) 
This Court has consistently recognized this principle 
and in White v. Newman, (Ut.) 348 P.2d 343 (1960) held 
that where there is no objection made to the admisibility of 
evidence, the Court will not entertain such claimed error. 
(See also Stragmeyer v. Leatham Brothers, Inc. (Ut.) 439 
P.2d 279 (1968); Child v. Child, (Ut.) 322 P.2d 981 (1958); 
Pettingill v. Perkins, (Ut.) 272 P.2d 185 (1954); Porcupine 
Reservoir Co v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp, (Ut.) 382 P.2d 620 
(1964); State v. Gilles, (Ut.) 123 p. 93 (1912).) 
Had Appellant's counsel objected to any of the 
proffered testimony, memorandum or exhibits at the hearing, 
Counsel for the State would have called Mr. Parker, who 
was present at the hearing pursuant to a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 
to the stand and taken his direct testimony and introduced through 
him the documents in question. 
It would be grossly unfair to allow Appellant to 
accuse the lower Court of error on appeal where Appellant's 
counsel stood by without raising any objection while the 
alleged error supposedly occurred. Therefore, since Appellant's 
counsel made no objection during the hearing as to any of 
the questioned evidence submitted by proffer, the alleged error 
has not been preserved for appeal and Appellant is not entitled 
to renew on this point pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant also contends that error was committed 
because the time requirement of Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure was not satisfied. 
It is a far stretch of the imagination to call 
Respondent's Memorandum a "motion" and an even farther 
stretch to call the supporting documents (the sa.me ones 
Appellant used in his Memorandum) attached thereto "affidavits". 
3 Am Jur 2d Affidavits §31 states that: 
"(An affidavit is a voluntary ex parte 
statement reduced to writing and sworn to or 
affirmed before someone legally authorized to 
administer an oath or affirmation." 
Neither of the attached doctmlents were under oath, so 
neither can be considered an affidavit. Furthermore, Respon-
dent's Memorandum was not a motion within the meaning of 
U.R.C.P. Rule 6, and its provisions, therefore, do not apply. 
Thus, there was no requirement of pre-hearing submission of 
the documents and there was no error committed. 
POINT III 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, 
INCLUDING THE FINAL JUDGMENT AMOUNT OF THE 
L0\\7ER COURT. 
47 Am Jur 2d Judgments §1210 states that: 
" . a judgment by default is conclusive, not 
only as to the validity of the cause of action 
forming the basis of the recovery, but also of 
the amount of the defendant's liability on the 
cause of action." 
(See Epstein v. Chatham Park, Inc., (Del.) 193 A.2d 180; 
Sidensparker v. Sidensparker, 52 Me 481; Candee v. Lord, 
2 NY 269.) Therefore, the judgment amount ~Pr hv t-na 1 nT_., __ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Court should be affirmed without remand. 
Appellant submits Pitts (supra) and J.P.W. ·Enter-
prises Inc. v. Naef, (Ut.) 604 P.2d 486 (1979) as supportive 
of the position that this Court should remand to the lower 
Court for a determination of the amount of the child support 
that should be paid by Appellant. The cited cases can be 
easily distinguished from"the present case on the basis of their 
facts. The two cases cited dealt with damage amounts that were 
very difficult to measure or substantiate and therefore 
necessitated a subsequent hearing to take evidence on the 
amount of damages that should be paid. 
In the present case, the damages (State child support 
expenditures) are easily ascertained. The State has the 
authority to seek full reimbursement of the amount expended 
on behalf of the Appellant's child and this amount is easily 
discerned from public records. Therefore, the amount 
expended or to be expended on Appellant's child does not 
require a great deal of evidentiary intake and the amount of 
damage is not nebulous enough to require a remand under the 
holdings of Pitts and J.P.W. Enterprises. 
By its nature, a default hearing requires no evidence 
with regard to the amount of damages where the damages 
requested are specific. The amount prayed for in a Complaint 
is routinely accepted as the correct amount. Furthermore, the 
Appellant failed to bring the question of the amount of child 
support before the lower Court. In fact, this is the first 
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time the issue of amount of damages has been raised as an 
issue by Appellant. Since this is an appeal, Appellant should 
not be permitted to raise an issue which has not been brought 
before the lower Court. 
The appropriate remedy for the Appellant on this issue 
would be to file a Petition for Modification of the Support 
Order rather than to seek a remand to reopen the default 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, Respondent respectfully 
asks this Court to affirm the judgment of the lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
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